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Many commentators have noted the existence of a historical correlation between cities 
and democratization (Dyson 2001: 83; Mumford 1995: 21). Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, this image of the city as an inherently civic space is fundamentally linked to 
the notion that the spatial concentration intrinsic to urban contexts promotes ‘a 
democracy of proximity, of participation by all in the management of public affairs’ 
(Borja and Castells 1997: 246). As Amin and Thrift (2004: 231) succinctly summarize: 
the city has very often been seen as a forcing ground for a politics of 
emancipation. Thus, the classical Graeco-Roman city is where the rule of 
democracy is supposed to have arisen, a democracy based upon the 
public deliberations of a supposedly ‘free’ citizenship... The medieval 
city, and later, the Renaissance city are held responsible for such seminal 
events as the rise of guild politics, the forging of institutions of civic 
republicanism and the principle of sanctuary based around the rise of 
independent city states. The Enlightenment city—through its institutions 
of learning, intellectual exchange, and secular science—is associated 
with the rise of universalism and a cosmopolitan ethos. And so on. 
Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that the most urbanized region of 
the global south, Latin America, is also a heartland of vibrant and much applauded 
democratic innovation. Of particular note are the myriad local level ‘radical democracy’ 
initiatives that have proliferated throughout the region’s cities during the past two 
decades (see Van Cott 2008: 8). These are widely considered to have led to a 
fundamental ‘reconfiguration of relationships and responsibilities’ (Cornwall 2004: 1) 
in urban Latin America, devolving political decision-making to ordinary citizens 
through a process of decentralized public deliberation, rather than the delegation of 
authority to elected agents that is characteristic of more conventional forms of 
representative democracy. Over 250 cities in the region have implemented participatory 
forms of democratic governance (see Cabannes 2004: 27), and more are doing so every 
day. At the same time, however, it is a significant paradox that Latin American urban 
centres are also amongst the most segregated in the world, something that is widely 
considered to have a significantly fragmenting effect on public space (Pirez 2002), and 
is therefore undermining of democracy, and more specifically of the communicative 
processes upon which participatory democratic initiatives are founded. 
This paper explores the logic of this apparent disjuncture, seeking to understand how it 
is that participatory democracy can flourish seemingly counter-intuitively in 
contemporary Latin America’s ‘fractured cities’ (Koonings and Kruijt 2007). It begins 
by considering the theory and practice of participatory democracy in a broad-brush 
manner, in order to first highlight how such initiatives are not necessarily as inherently 
transformative as often thought to be, before then questioning the putative link that is 
often made between urban contexts and democratic practices. Drawing on Teresa 
Caldeira’s (2008) recent research on ‘neoliberal’ participatory planning policies in São 
Paulo, Brazil, the paper then shows how participatory democratic initiatives can, in fact, 
actively promote urban segregation, to the extent that a heuristic parallel can be made 
with South African apartheid’s notorious policy of ‘separate but equal development’. 
What this dramatic comparison starkly highlights is how in order to be truly 
encompassing, participatory democratic practices need to be implemented within the 
context of a unifying and integrating governance framework that is ultimately 2 
determined by broader political economy considerations. These, however, are 
particularly unfavourable in a contemporary Latin America characterized by extremely 
high levels of inequality and exclusion. The conclusion of the paper attempts to mitigate 
this rather depressing analysis by exploring how emancipatory democratic practices 
might nevertheless emerge in unpromising circumstances, drawing on the ‘extraordinary 
events’ framework recently proposed by Irazábal (2008), and illustrating it through a 
theoretical consideration of the contingent origins of the, at least initially, remarkable 
participatory budgeting process implemented in post-crisis Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
2  Participatory democracy in theory and practice 
In very general terms, participatory democratic initiatives can be said to concern an 
institutional model of governance that is based on a deliberative as opposed to a 
representational democratic framework. Rather than being organized around the 
delegation of decision-making to an elected agent, participatory democracy extends and 
enhances citizen participation in governance by devolving the exercise of authority 
through a process of bottom-up public deliberation. Intense personal interaction and 
collaboration generate mutual understandings and shared concerns, and consensual 
forms of governance are established through the persuasive transformation of 
preferences by force of communication and (the better) argument (see Avritzer 2002: 
36-54). As such, it corresponds to ‘a conception of the vitalization of democracy 
… through popular participation’ (Harriss et al. 2005: 1), and is seen to be radically 
different forms to representative democracy. It is widely considered to be not only 
fairer, more inclusive, and leading to more efficient policies and decision-making, but is 
also widely thought to inherently transform individuals into better citizens, and enhance 
the quality of their life and government. At the same time, however, participatory 
democratic initiatives are not just bottom-up, voluntaristic forms of organization insofar 
as they are fundamentally state-centred processes, with the state remaining the principal 
medium for the enactment of the consensually agreed-upon ‘common good’. To this 
extent, they can be said to involve a potentially fundamental transformation of this all-
important connection between state and society by creating ‘a new relationship between 
government personnel and local citizens’ (Abers 1998: 511). 
The best-known form of deliberative democracy is undoubtedly participatory budgeting. 
The forms of participatory budgeting are highly diverse, but the process basically 
involves citizens participating in forums for discussion about budgetary concerns, 
generally at the municipal level, although participatory budgeting has also been 
experimented with at the provincial state level. The central goal of participatory 
budgeting is to hand over decisions about the allocation of municipal funds for basic 
urban infrastructural improvements—paving streets, extending drainage, building new 
schools and health centres, etc.—to neighbourhood-level forums. The proportion of a 
municipal budget controlled by a participatory budgeting process can vary 
tremendously, from just a few per cent to the whole of the investment budget of a 
municipality; and some participatory budgeting processes—such as the one 
implemented in Buenos Aires, for example—seek to determine an order of public work 
priorization rather than a specific percentage of municipal spending (in some ways 
making them forms of participatory planning). Participatory budgeting has become 
extremely popular all over the world, and numerous cities in Africa, Asia, Europe, as 
well as North and South America, have implemented it, although undoubtedly the most 3 
paradigmatic instance is that of Porto Alegre in Brazil, where participatory budgeting 
was actually first applied in 1989 (see Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2005; Wampler 2007). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider participatory democratic initiatives in 
anything other than a broad-brush manner.1 But a striking element of the vast majority 
of studies about such processes is that few actually offer any concrete data regarding 
whether they make a difference in developmental terms. Although Abers (1998) argues 
that Porto Alegre enjoys better than average infrastructure and better performing public 
services than any other Brazilian city of comparable size and socio-economic profile 
that has not implemented participatory budgeting, it is striking to note that the Porto 
Alegre population voted out the Brazilian Workers’ Party that implemented 
participatory budgeting, and elected a mayor, José Fogaça, who has explicitly criticized 
the process, and indeed, has been actively dismantling it (see Koonings 2009). What in 
fact clearly emerges from an even cursory survey of the literature is that many 
contributions are imbued with a significant romantic—and sometimes even fanatical—
idealism. There is a widespread but not necessarily explicit view that participatory 
democratic initiatives are inherently transformative and will by the very force of their 
existence, sweep all before them. Suffice to point out in this respect that the American 
sociologist Erik Olin Wright’s (2003) preface to the overview volume co-edited with 
Archon Fung is entitled ‘The Real Utopias Project’, while a comparable tome in 
Spanish edited by the Argentinean political scientist Ricardo Romero (2005) is entitled 
Democracia Participativa: Una Utopía en Marcha (Participatory Democracy: A Utopia 
on the March). 
In both these cases, the term ‘utopia’ is used according to Thomas More’s (2005 [1516]: 
120) original coining of the expression, that is to say associating participatory 
democracy with ‘the best in the world’. The word has also come to have a much more 
widespread second meaning, however, designating ‘an impossibly ideal scheme’.2 This 
second sense of the term probably best describes contemporary participatory democratic 
processes in Latin America, especially when one considers the practical pitfalls that 
they must surmount to be meaningfully implemented. Evans (2002) outlines three basic 
problems. First, participatory democratic initiatives must be economically efficient. 
Second, there must be sustained participation. Finally, they have to overcome what he 
calls the ‘political economy problem’. The first two issues we can take as a given. 
Deliberative policymaking involving economic affairs will be subject to the same laws 
of accounting as non-deliberative forms of government, and without participants, there 
can be no process. The political economy problem is less straightforward, however. It 
can be approached in two ways, ‘endogenously’ and ‘exogenously’. The ‘endogenous’ 
view focuses on the way that power relations play out between those participating 
within the deliberative process. As Baiocchi (2001) points out, inequality within 
participatory democratic processes can subvert public deliberation in a variety of 
different ways. Certain participants may be better-off citizens or dominant groups as a 
result of their privileged links to political parties or the State, for example, and might 
use their superior resources to promote collective decisions that favour them. Other 
                                                 
1 For wide-ranging collections of detailed studies, see the excellent special issues of Politics and Society 
on ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (vol. 29(1) 2001), Environment and Urbanization on 
‘Participatory Governance’ (vol. 16(2) 2004), and of the IDS Bulletin on ‘New Democratic Spaces’ (vol. 
35(2) 2004), as well as the volumes by Chavez and Goldfrank (2004), Cornwall and Coelho (2007), Fung 
and Wright (2003), and Harriss et al. (2005). 
2 See ‘utopia’, Oxford English Dictionary, http://dictionary.oed.com/.  4 
powerful participants may attempt to exclude or avoid issues that threaten their 
interests, to the extent that in cases where deliberative democratic arrangements 
challenge their power and privileges, they may actually seek to dismantle them. 
Ultimately, as Schönleitner (2006: 44) remarks, ‘if powerful actors do not renounce 
their power over others as a means for shaping collective decisions, deliberation can 
hardly be sustained’. 
This latter point relates directly to the ‘exogenous’ dimension of the political economy 
problem. It is difficult to imagine institutional innovations such as participatory 
democracy emerging in contexts where particular individuals and groups have a 
disproportionate amount of power as a result of the existing political framework, as 
these will obviously have an interest in perpetuating the current system. For the same 
reason, even the formal existence of an institutional framework for participation does 
not guarantee that a participatory process will occur, insofar as rules can be ignored or 
not respected. Although it is not completely implausible to imagine circumstances 
where traditionally dominant political actors might be prepared to spontaneously give 
up (at least part of) their power in favour of institutions that incorporate ordinary 
citizens, this is relatively unlikely except in very specific contexts and under particular 
circumstances, and the critical question to ask concerning any participatory democratic 
initiative is therefore clearly ‘what political context is necessary to carry out such an 
experiment in the real world’? (Baiocchi 2001: 45). 
The classic study attempting to answer this question is Heller’s ground-breaking 
comparative examination of participatory democratic initiatives in India, South Africa, 
and Brazil, where he underlines how such processes were ‘given life …because they 
were underwritten by …the political initiative of a programmatic party’, generally 
associated with a subaltern class (Heller 2001: 158).3 A slightly different perspective is 
provided by Goldfrank (2007) in his recent comparison of the divergent experiences of 
participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre on the one hand, and Montevideo, Uruguay, and 
Caracas, Venezuela, on the other. In contrast to Heller, he argues that it was the weak 
political opposition to the promotion of participatory budgeting—rather than its strong 
promotion—that allowed its coherent implementation in the former city, while strong 
resistance in the latter two led to more ‘restrictive designs …in which citizen input was 
limited and subordinated within formal, party-dominated structures’ (Goldfrank 2007: 
148). This leads Goldfrank (2007: 165) to conclude that ‘in cities with strongly 
institutionalized parties, decentralization will likely result in elite capture and 
exclusionary politics. Even where new parties win office, established parties can 
debilitate institutional reforms. In cities with weakly institutionalized parties, however, 
decentralization’s democracy-enhancing benefits are more likely to filter through’.4 
The link that Goldfrank makes to the city is by no means fortuitous. His study highlights 
how participatory democratic initiatives require very specific enabling contexts in order 
to flourish, and he associates the particular configurations of party politics in the three 
cities with the varying natures of their urban contexts, including in particular differing 
                                                 
3 Other studies that have reached similar conclusions include Baiocchi (2003), Goldfrank and Schneider 
(2006), Van Cott (2008), and Wampler (2007). 
4 Goldfrank’s analysis is in fact quite complementary of Heller’s, insofar as the existence of weakly 
institutionalized parties is no guarantor of the emergence of participatory democratic initiatives, and some 
programmatic impulse is inevitably needed to promote them, but conversely the latter is also not enough 
by itself to ensure their implementation. 5 
levels of inequality, social mobility, and access to public services.5 The concern with 
the nature of the city as a variable in its own right is one that implicitly or explicitly runs 
through all studies of participatory democracy. In his classic study of participatory 
processes in Brazil and Mexico, for example, Avritzer (2002) develops his notion of 
‘participatory publics’ based on a very particular conception of the urban public sphere, 
the roots of which ‘can be traced back to the Greek polis and the way it connected 
community and democracy’ (2002: 36), or in other words, the (perceived) specificity of 
urban contexts as inherently bringing otherwise disparate individuals into contact with 
each other.6 
The problem with this vision of urban life is that it does not quite square with the 
observable reality of the overwhelming majority of contemporary Latin American cities, 
however. These are amongst the most segregated in the world, with high levels of 
violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2004), spatial inequality (Koonings and Kruijt 2007), 
the proliferation of gated communities (Caldeira 2000), and the growth of ‘precarious 
peripheries’ (Rolnik 2001), all widely reported to be primary features. As Gareth Jones 
(2004: 171) observes, such phenomena are clearly ‘not …compatible with more 
inclusive notions of citizenship’, being in particular fundamentally undermining of the 
communicative processes upon which participatory democratic initiatives are founded. 
Focusing in particular on the potential consequences of the proliferation of gated 
enclaves in Latin American cities, Jones (2004: 171) asks ‘how can norms be 
constructed where difference is defensive, diversity is mistrusted, and education, even if 
it had rarely ever meant learning with ‘others’, now might not impress to learn about 
others either? What kind of radical or deeper democracy can emerge in societies in 
which a numerically small but economically significant group is physically isolated, 
socially less engaged and economically less dependent on the remainder of society?’. 
Yet the fact remains that participatory democratic initiatives have emerged—and 
continue to do so—in such extremely unlikely contexts, with the Brazilian city of São 
Paulo a case in point, as Caldeira describes in recent work. 
3  ‘Neoliberal’ participatory planning in São Paulo, Brazil 
Caldeira is of course well-known for her seminal work City of Walls (2000), which 
traces the way rising crime and insecurity changed the cityscape of São Paulo from the 
1980s onwards, transforming it from a space of open circulation to a fragmented 
archipelago of isolated ‘fortified enclaves’. She famously argued that this new urban 
morphology was most visible in the proliferation of self-sufficient gated communities 
and closed condominiums for the affluent, and contended that these significantly altered 
the character of urban public space in São Paulo, as those on the ‘inside’ of the enclaves 
no longer related to notions of spatial cohabitation with those on the ‘outside’, but rather 
                                                 
5 To the extent that urban political morphology inevitably reflects the broader societal political economy, 
Goldfrank’s observation is not necessarily surprising, and can in many ways be seen as a re-statement of 
Evans’ ‘political economy problem’. 
6 Indeed, the main elements Avritzer (2002: 51) associates with the emergence of participatory publics, 
that is to say ‘free expression and discussion, the formation of plural identities, and free association’, can 
be directly linked to the vision outlined by Louis Wirth (1938: 192) in his classic article ‘Urbanism as a 
Way of Life’, whereby ‘the juxtaposition of divergent personalities and modes of life [in cities] tends to 
produce a relativistic perspective and a sense of toleration of difference which may be regarded as 
prerequisites for rationality and which lead toward the secularization of life’. 6 
to an ideal of separation from them. This in turn impacted on notions of citizenship and 
politics in Brazil, breeding exclusion, social differentiation, and inequality. It is largely 
due to Caldeira’s work that the relationship between urban fragmentation, citizenship, 
and democracy has become a key concern of contemporary urban development 
scholarship on Latin America, as the many studies drawing on her ideas published over 
the past decade attest well.7 Caldeira’s (2008) recent research has focused on the 
regulation of São Paulo’s urban development, and more specifically on the rise of what 
she labels ‘neoliberal’ participatory planning policies, and their consequences for the 
city. The analysis that she puts forward in this regard offers certain helpful elements to 
understanding why it is that participatory democratic initiatives have emerged in such 
an unpromisingly fragmented and segregated context as São Paulo. 
Broadly speaking, Caldeira (2008) presents the rise of participatory planning in Brazil 
as part of a new generation of urban policy that has developed since the country’s return 
to democracy in the late 1980s. This has been underpinned by a new vision for the 
ordering of urban space, the nature of which is epitomized by the country’s Estatuto da 
Cidade, or Law of the City, a federal piece of legislation mandated by Brazil’s 1988 
constitution and passed in 2001. This established the objective of urban policy to be the 
realization of ‘the social functions of the city and urban property’, through a ‘just 
distribution of the benefits and costs of the urbanization process’ (Caldeira and Holston 
2005: 406). Brazilian municipalities were directed to formulate master plans based on 
the  principles of ‘popular participation’ and ‘democratic management’, in order to 
guarantee ‘the right to sustainable cities, understood as the right to urban land, housing, 
sanitation, infrastructure, transportation and public services, work, and leisure for 
present and future generations’. As such, the Law of the City establishes ‘the production 
of social equality in urban space as a fundamental objective of urban planning and 
policy’ and turns ‘planning into a basic instrument for equalising social disparities and 
securing social equality’. Over 1,600 Brazilian municipalities have reformulated their 
master plans in line with this law since it was passed, including São Paulo.8 
At first glance, this new urban policy would clearly seem to have the potential to 
promote a much more egalitarian ordering of urban space in Brazil, explicitly allowing 
for the empowerment of the excluded by placing them on an equal footing with those 
who have withdrawn into gated communities and closed condominiums. Caldeira 
(2008), however, contends that the new measures at best legalize existing spatial 
inequalities, and at worse, actually increase them, because far from constituting any sort 
of radical intervention, the new urban policies enshrined in the Law of the City—
including participatory planning—constitute little more than an epiphenomena of the 
broader ‘neoliberal’ model that has been institutionalized in Brazil since the late 1980s. 
She points, for example, how there exists a definite discursive coincidence between 
‘neoliberalism’ and participatory democracy, insofar as the vocabulary of the Law of 
the City makes extensive use of ‘neoliberal’ terms such as ‘participation’, ‘initiative’, 
‘entrepreneurialism’, ‘autonomy’, and most of all, ‘management’. More substantively, 
she also notes clear correlations between ‘neoliberalism’ and participatory democracy, 
insofar as both seek to promote grassroots social action and move away from top-down 
                                                 
7 See for example Borsdorf (2002); Fischer et al. (2003); Rodgers (2004); Sabatini and Arenas (2000); 
Salcedo and Torres (2004); and Svampa (2001). 
8 See Caldeira and Holston (2005), Earle (2009), and Fernandes (2007) for fuller discussions of the 
Estatuto da Cidade. 7 
forms of governance. However, ‘neoliberalism’s primary concern lies with the 
dismantling of the interventionalist state’, rather than the promotion of social justice 
inherent to participatory democracy, and it seeks to allow ‘entrepreneurial citizens to 
organize themselves and formulate the initiatives that will implement their interests’, 
which Caldeira suggests will effectively benefit those wielding most power in society, 
since the dismantled ‘neoliberal’ state in contemporary Brazil is no longer able to act as 
an impartial and egalitarian arbitrator between various interests groups in the way the 
previous developmental state was. 
Caldeira (2008) illustrates this through a detailed analysis of the 2002 São Paulo Master 
Plan. This ostensibly sought to address the issue of socio-spatial inequality in the city by 
promoting the densification of areas that were already legally provided with 
infrastructure, and slowing down the illegal expansion of the city towards new areas in 
the periphery. In line with the ideals of the Law of the City, the master plan stipulated 
that all planning, implementation, and control of urban policy was to be participatory, 
through active engagement and partnership with civil society, and the proposed Plan 
was debated at a series of participatory public hearings that were held over the course of 
several months. These principally involved three coalition groups of Paulista citizens: 
the Frente pela Cidadania (Front for Citizenship), which was principally made up of 
real estate developers; the Frente Popular pelo Plano Diretor (Popular Front for the 
Master Plan), made up of popular movements, planners, consultants, and university-
based researchers; and the Movimento Defenda São Paulo  (Defend São Paulo 
Movement), which represented the interests of affluent upper-middle class 
neighbourhood associations.  
All three groups actively sought to modify the content of the master plan proposal put 
forward by the São Paulo municipality, but did so in ways that would initially seem 
quite distinct. The real estate developers and affluent neighbourhood associations, for 
example, acted quite explicitly in line with their own parochial interest. The real estate 
developers’ group, for example, sought to have the radical proposal of unifying land use 
regulations in the city and subjecting vertical construction to extra taxation abandoned, 
and successfully lobbied for a heterogeneous zoning regime that would allow for 
variable land utilization rates, albeit with higher construction standards for more 
intensely used land, thereby making city centre property more valuable. The affluent 
neighbourhood associations, for their part, successfully fought proposed changes in 
zoning regulations that would have affected the privileges of the exclusive residential 
areas they represented, spuriously justifying their endeavours by invoking concern for 
environmental issues, amongst other things. The Frente Popular pelo Plano Diretor, on 
the other hand, advocated for the establishment of Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social 
(Special Zones of Social Interest—ZEIS) that would identify currently illegal low-
income areas for state intervention in the form of legalization and upgrading, while 
simultaneously protecting them from real estate speculation by formally establishing 
them as areas devoted to low-income housing. 
On the face of things, this latter development would seem to be squarely in line with the 
basic principles theoretically underlying the master plan, that is to say the promotion of 
social and spatial justice, and therefore very different to the more parochial proposals 
pushed through by the real estate-dominated Front for Citizenship or the Defend São 
Paulo Movement affluent neighbourhood association coalition. Caldeira (2008) 
however points out that the ZEIS proposal effectively subjected low-income 
neighbourhoods to different land use rules than the rest of the city, thereby making it as 8 
parochial as the other proposals put forward. As a result, the new zoning regime adopted 
by the São Paulo Master Plan—following participatory democratic deliberation—ended 
up protecting richer areas of the city as exclusively residential or by making them more 
expensive to occupy, while institutionalizing low-standards ZEIS in poorer areas of the 
city, and thereby impeding any possible gentrification in these areas. The creation of 
these different urban standards constituted ‘a clear reiteration of the legal distinctions 
between centre and periphery that the new rationality of planning was intended to 
extinguish’, according to Caldeira (2008), and as such can be seen as a ‘legalization of 
inequality’ which contrasts strongly with the past, where inequality was intimately 
associated with illegality (see Earle 2009). In other words, a participatory democratic 
initiative intended to reverse pervasive urban inequality ended up institutionalizing it.9 
4  Separate but equal democratization? 
Bénit (2006) describes a very analogous process to the Paulista one detailed by Caldeira 
in an insightful article on the relationship between participatory democracy and spatial 
justice in Johannesburg, the capital of South Africa. She focuses on the debates that 
surrounded attempts to implement participatory urban planning in the township of 
Alexandra, and contrasts them with those put in motion in the nearby rich business 
district of Sandton, highlighting in particular how different pressures impacted in both 
locations on the debate over whether to keep the two areas segregated or to integrate 
them in view of their intimate economic links, Alexandra township providing much of 
the menial labour for Sandton. Bénit suggests that this debate points to a forgotten 
question concerning urban participatory democratic governance, namely the issue of 
scale, which she contends has important political implications. According to Bénit 
(2006: 58-59): 
participation is by definition local in scale, while a metropolitan vision 
can only be articulated from above. To expect local negotiations to lead 
to the emergence of coherent citywide governance (as most theorist of 
participation seem to expect) reduces—whether by default, convictions, 
or cynicism—what is a fundamentally political issue to a simple 
aggregation of preferences. Spatial justice cannot be built from the local 
level alone, and therefore participatory urbanism cannot exist coherently 
without explicit top-down urban planning.10  
                                                 
9 Although Caldeira (2008) also contends that the Law of the City and the master plans it has spawned—
and even to a certain extent the idea of ZEIS—can be seen as potentially providing powerful instruments 
to help foster social justice and reduce spatial inequality if deployed in a slight more enabling context, the 
reality is much more ambiguous. As the work of Earle (2009) on housing movements in São Paulo 
highlights well, the particular political conditions to which the provisions of the master plan have 
contributed mean that they end up making their claims through illegal acts of civil disobedience rather 
than the institutionalized channels of democratic participation. 
10 I have taken some liberties with my translation. Original French: ‘La participation est par essence 
d’échelle locale et quotidienne ; il est au contraire du ressort des politiques de définir, de présenter et de 
soumettre au débat la vision d’un ou de plusieurs avenirs métropolitains possibles. Attendre du concert 
des négociations locales et localistes l’émergence d’une vision d’échelle métropolitaine (comme le 
préconisent la plupart des théories de la participation) conduit bien souvent à réduire le politique—par 
défaut, conviction ou cynisme—à un simple accompagnement des dynamiques de marché. Pas 9 
In other words, participatory planning in cities necessarily requires a unifying, 
integrating framework. 
My invocation of Bénit’s South African research in this respect is not fortuitous. In 
many ways, the differentiated participatory democracy that she describes bears an 
uncanny resemblance to the South African apartheid regime’s notorious ‘separate but 
equal development’ policy.11 Based on the spurious notion that the different racial 
groups of South Africa could only develop to their full potential if they were separated 
from one another, the idea of ‘separate development’ underpinned the apartheid regime, 
but the initial fiction of different races developing separately in their own ‘homelands’ 
quickly gave way to an unambiguous policy of white domination (see Posel 1991). It is 
only a small step to think of Caldeira’s ‘neoliberal’ participatory planning in São Paulo 
as being based on an analogous form of ‘separate but equal democratization’, 
particularly in view of the way that it legitimizes and reinforces existing patterns of elite 
domination in the city, with its differentiated land use regulations and the creation of the 
ZEIS. The analogy is arguably all the more pertinent when one considers that the 
apartheid policy of ‘separate but equal development’ was originally a ‘response to 
urbanization perceived to have run wild’ (Jensen 2008: 16-17), a concern that the São 
Paulo Master Plan explicitly raises as a justification for instituting participatory 
planning practices. 
Although the parallel may seem a little extreme, it is arguably a necessary one to make 
considering the way that participatory democratic initiatives often have a significant 
depoliticizing effect, as Pieterse (2008) points out. By advancing the ideal of a locally-
built consensus over and above any systemic considerations, they obscure the real 
determinants of city governance, which are less the institutional mechanisms that are 
put in place (or not), but rather the systemic relations of power within urban society. It 
is this issue that I particularly want to highlight by drawing a parallel between 
participatory democratic initiatives and apartheid’s ‘separate but equal development’ 
policy. In order to understand the dynamics of participatory democratic initiatives, we 
must consider the overarching urban political economy within which they are 
implemented. This is arguably particularly important to take into account in a 
contemporary Latin America where participatory democracy is flourishing despite 
exclusion, fragmentation, and segregation. The conventional view is that participatory 
democratic initiatives are proliferating because they will mitigate these phenomena. 
Caldeira’s account of participatory planning in São Paulo, however, suggests that they 
can institutionalize them instead, and although she doesn’t make the link explicitly, it 
can be contended that this is likely why such measures are being implemented. They 
serve the purposes of the elite in São Paulo who can decide whether or not to implement 
them, and it is this, more than anything else, that explains the rise of participatory 
democracy in the seemingly unpromising circumstances of São Paulo, as well as other 
cities in Latin America. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
d’urbanisme participatif sans urbanisme: …la justice spatiale …ne saurait se construire à la seule échelle 
locale’. 
11 The parallel between apartheid and post-apartheid urban planning and development is something that 
also has also been noted in the work of Lemanski (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007).  10 
5  Conclusion: extraordinary events and contingent democratization 
The above analysis is admittedly a rather depressing one, especially when considered in 
relation to the practical possibilities for promoting social justice in contemporary urban 
Latin America. I therefore want to turn my attention in this concluding section to the 
question of how truly emancipatory democratic practices might nevertheless emerge in 
the face of the overwhelmingly unfavourable socio-political circumstances. In this 
respect, it is worth remembering, as Jones (2004: 172) reminds us, that while urban 
public spaces inevitably reflect broader power relations, they are also 
 the sites of the contestation of power. Spaces are made public when they 
inform others about the discourses of the groups that physically occupy 
them or symbolically invest them with meaning. Public space therefore is 
performative, where identities are exposed and communicated, 
interpreted, understood, and transformed.  
This is an insight that goes to the core of the ‘extraordinary events’ framework recently 
proposed by Irazábal (2008), which seeks to explain how urban spaces can come to be 
(re)configured in contemporary Latin America in ways that go beyond hegemonic 
relations of power within society. In particular, she argues that certain political and 
social events, which she labels ‘extraordinary events’, can actively (re)frame urban 
space in ways that challenge existing patterns of domination. Her edited volume details 
a range of such events, some mundane, others more obviously exceptional, but all of 
which involve a reshaping of the urban public sphere through the creation of often 
highly contingent alternative meanings and occupations. 
A concrete example of the way an ‘extraordinary event’ led to meaningful social change 
that is particularly germane to the discussion of participatory democratic governance is 
the highly unlikely implementation of participatory budgeting in the city of Buenos 
Aires in 2002, which occurred in the face of significant opposition from the dominant 
urban political class, and within a context known for its particularly complex and even 
byzantine political dynamics (Levitsky 2001). This was a direct result of the crisis 
known as the Argentinazo that affected Argentina in December 2001, which upset the 
political balance of power in the city of Buenos Aires, and which led to the 
crystallization of unique and temporary political circumstances that contingently created 
a space in which a truly emancipatory participatory budgeting process was able to 
emerge, at least for a while (see Rodgers 2010). The different actors involved interacted 
in particular ways that, first, produced a space within which a participatory budgeting 
process could be introduced, before, second, holding both top-down and bottom-up 
attempts to politically manipulate the process in check, thereby allowing a genuine 
sense of local autonomy and empowerment to flourish during the first few years of the 
process, as I have described in ethnographic detail elsewhere (see Rodgers 2007). 
Subsequent shifts in the Buenos Aires political field upset this delicate balancing act, 
and led to the gradual erosion of the city’s participatory budgeting process, but it 
remains an important case to consider because it highlights how ‘politics is an 
“instituted process”, embedded in institutions political and non-political’, which cannot 
‘be understood simply through the analysis of formal arrangements for representation, 
decision-making and policy implementation’ (Lowndes 2001: 1960 and 1955). 
In particular, the implementation of participatory budgeting in Buenos Aires highlights 
a critical but underestimated dimension of the politics of ‘instituted processes’, which is 11 
that they are frequently much less purposeful and directed than we often imagine them 
to be. Although most of the diverse actors involved in the Buenos Aires participatory 
budgeting process, whether acting top-down or bottom-up, had relatively clear aims and 
aspirations, the very fact of interacting with each other in the context of a ‘moment of 
shock’ such as the Argentinazo meant that their actions inevitably became imbued with 
a significant degree of ‘contingency’,12 both intrinsically as well as in relation to the 
way they came together. This was true in a way that goes beyond the fact that social 
practices will inevitably have unanticipated consequences—as Robert Merton (1936) 
classically pointed out over seventy years ago—or accepting that institutional 
arrangements will be imbued with ‘a certain degree of opacity …that cannot easily be 
modelled, predicted or managed’ (Cleaver 2000: 382). Rather, what the contingent 
implementation and execution of participatory budgeting in Buenos Aires illustrates 
very well is how institution-building can often occur less as the result of purposeful 
socio-political action and more as the consequence of contextually and temporally 
specific articulations of both conscious and unconscious intents and practices, that in 
turn have both intended and unintended meanings and consequences that are beyond the 
control of the actors involved. 
This is crucial when considered in relation to the analysis offered in this paper regarding 
the introduction of participatory democratic initiatives in contexts of extreme inequality 
such as those characteristic of the vast majority of Latin American urban contexts. 
Although under such conditions instances of participatory governance often become 
little more than forms of ‘separate but equal democratization’ that legitimize and sustain 
highly unequal and iniquitous structures and systems of power and domination, the 
Buenos Aires case illustrates how enabling environments can emerge contingently as a 
result of ‘extraordinary events’, and how participatory democratic governance does not 
necessarily have to stem from purposeful social action, to the extent that it can make 
sense to talk of processes of ‘contingent democratization’. Understanding and 
potentially harnessing these moments, however, requires a fine-grained understanding 
of the dynamics of urban contexts and the social actors that inhabit them, and therefore 
‘any analysis of the limits and opportunities for participatory governance needs to start 
from particular places and issues on which citizens act, rather than with abstract notions 
of citizenship and participation. This requires narrating and situating stories of citizen 
action, and working back from these stories to explore what was going on in terms of 
relationships and positioning, and what understandings and analytical tools might make 
best sense of these forms of engagement (and whether the notion of citizenship has any 
place in this at all)’ (Robins, Cornwall and von Lieres 2008: 1082). Only through this 
kind of detailed vision are we likely to be able to identify avenues through which to 
meaningfully promote measures to overcome the deep segregation of Latin American 




                                                 
12 I use the term in relation to ‘the condition of being free from predetermining necessity in regard to 
existence or action’ (see ‘contingency’, Oxford English Dictionary, http://dictionary.oed.com/). 12 
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